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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Search and Seizure-Electronic Recording and
Listening Devices. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).

Katz was tried and convicted in the United States District Court, Southern District of California, for transmitting
wagering information via telephone in violation of a federal
statute.' The government's primary evidence consisted of
recordings of the defendant's end of telephone conversations
procured by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The officers accomplished their surveillance by attaching a
listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which the defendant's calls emanated.
An appeal was taken, Katz contending that the recordings
had been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting appellant's contention because there was no physical encroachment of the
area utilized by him.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The majority, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Stewart,
declined to subscribe to the concept of constitutionally protected areas and further denied the necessity of a physical
penetration as a component of an illegal search and seizure.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the use of the
recording and listening device by the agents without prior
approval by a judge or magistrate violated the privacy upon
which the petitioner justifiably relied while occupying and
utilizing the telephone booth, and was per se an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
As early as 1886,2 American jurists recognized that privacy was an individual right worthy of protection. In 1890,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis propounded their
monumental chronology of common law recognition and protection of the individual's person and property, concluding,
"now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy
life-the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964). "(a) Whoever being engaged in the business
of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
1.
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the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property' has grown to compromise every form of possessionintangible as well as tangible."' Now, advocated these eminent scholars, there had arrived a time which demanded that
steps be taken "for securing to the individual ... the right
'to be let alone.' '" Thereafter, in the case of Weeks v.
United States5 the Supreme Court of the United States construed the fourth amendment as including within its penumbra
this 'right of privacy,' a right not explicitly enumerated in
the amendment.
However, that electronic eavesdropping' was a species of
search and seizure encompassed by the scope of the fourth
amendment, or that such surveillance violated the individual's
right of privacy, were propositions rejected by a 5-4 majority
in Olmstead v. United States.' In that case, federal officers
procured evidence of Prohibition violations by tapping telephone transmission lines. The Court was unable to perceive
a violation of the fourth amendment, because there was no
physical trespass, and hence no "search." 8 Further, there
was no "seizure" because no material thing, no tangible
object, was confiscated.' Although the form of wiretapping
employed in Olmstead was later prohibited totally by the
Federal Communications Act, Section 605,11 other forms of
electronic eavesdropping continued to be the source of a wide
divergence in opinion among the members of the Court.
The material-object rationale of Olmstead was repudi1 2 The Court held
ated by the Court in Irvine v. California.
that
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890).
Id. at 195.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Although in its primary form, electronic eavesdropping was interpreted as
including wiretapping, it is necessary to understand that with development
of sensitive detection devices, the two terms became indicative of two
totally different means of surveillance. Electronic eavesdropping as presently connoted requires no physical terminal between the listening device
and an electronic transmission line. Consequently, although wiretapping
has been legislatively prohibited, electronic eavesdropping has so far
received no Congressional attention in the form of legislation.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 464.
Id. at 464.
For a definitive differentiation between "wiretapping" and "electronic
eavesdropping" see Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., Pt. 5 at 1822-23 (1959). Generally, the distinguishing characteristic is lack of or presence of wiring or physical contact with any object
of electronic transmission.
Communications Act of 1934, Ch. 652, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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conversations, however intangible they might be, could indeed
be seized. The conversations subjected to surveillance in
that case were held to be seized in contravention of the spirit
and intendment of the fourth amendment. 3 Hence, a substantial premise of the Olmstead decision was vitiated.
But the requirement of a physical trespass persisted,
despite electronic and technological developments which vindicated Justice Brandeis' warning in his Olmstead dissent.
He had admonished:
Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power must have ...
a capacity of adaptation to a changing world. The
progress of science in furnishing the Government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with
wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by
which the Government, without removing papers
from secret drawers can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury
the most intimate occurrences of the home.14
Thus, despite the accuracy of those premonitions, in
Goldman v. United States 5 the Court held admissible evidence of conversations obtained by placing an electronic
device against the outside of a wall. And in On Lee v. United
States," incriminating conversations were procured through
the agency of a tiny transistor hidden on an undercover
agent. The Court held that this did not amount to an unlawful
invasion of privacy, because the eavesdropper was an invitee
and hence there was no physical trespass. In the recent case
of Silverman v. United States,7 the Court purported to
eliminate the requirement of the traditional trespass. Although evidence obtained by a listening device inserted into
the defendant's heating system was held inadmissible, the
Court denied that its decision was based on a "technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls,""8
but pointed instead to the existence of a "physical penetration."1 9 The distinction was tenuous, and unfortunately the
Court retained the requirement of some physical relationship
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.

277
316
843
365

U.S. 438,
U.S. 129
U.S. 747
U.S. 505
Id. at 511.
Id. at 509.

474 (1928).
(1942).
(1952).
(1961).

(Dissenting opinion).
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between the premises which the defendant occupies and the
listening device. In the principal case the anachronistic
requirement of a physical intrusion has been discarded, and
the Court has expressed a view which is certainly more compatible with contemporary concepts of individual privacy.
Katz' rationale provides the only possibly adequate protection of privacy, a right which becomes increasingly susceptible
to intrusion because of astronomical advances in technological
development. There presently exists a vast array of electronic
devices which are completely efficient despite the absense
the slightest proximity to the area being monitored."0
In holding the recordings inadmissible the majority
stated, "the fact that the electronic device employed. . . did
not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance."'" The opinion explicitly overruled Olmstead and Goldman," and rendered the tenuous
premise of the Silverman holding insignificant. It eliminated
a glaring fallacy which persisted in cases from Olmstead to
Silverman, a fallacy decried by Mr. Justice Douglas concurring in Silverman: "An electronic device on the outside wall
of a house is a permissible invasion of privacy . . .while an
electronic device that penetrates the wall, as here, is not. Yet
the invasion of privacy is as great in one case as in the
other."" That an unauthorized physical penetration of the
premise is irrelevant is a recognition long overdue.
Katz additionally vitiates the concept of the "constitutionally protected area" as a touchstone for solutions to fourth
amendment controversies. As interpreted by the Court in the
present case, the amendment protects "people, not places." 2 4
The test propounded is a subjective one: Was there a justifiable reliance on existence of privacy in an isolated situation? Whether the area in which the situation evolves is
public or private, the legality of the eavesdrop centers on
the victim's reliance.2 5 Where such justifiable reliance is
found to exist, any unauthorized surveillance will be illegal.
Thus, the existence or absence of a physical intrusion will be
20. For a summary of the array of available devices, see DASH, SCHWARTZ &
KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS, 330 (1959).
21. 88 S. Ct. 507, 510 (1967).

22. Id. at 512.

23. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
24. 88 S. Ct. 507, 510 (1967).
25. Id. at 511, 512.
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immaterial, because the scope of protection is no longer a
function of physical delimitation. Rather, the physical area
involved is an element to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the victim's reliance on privacy. Only by
approaching the issue as the Court has in Katz can a determination consistent with the modern concept of an intrusion
be accomplished. Intrusions no longer require forcible physical entries, but are as completely accomplished by employment
of electronic gadgets whose penetrations are intangible. Without the application given it in the present case, the fourth
amendment was destined to be relegated to impotence, an
unfortunate commentary on the inability of the judiciary to
adapt to rapid change. By extending the coverage of the
fourth amendment to such situations as the present, the Court
has secured to the individual freedom to "open his collar...
and give vent to his own particular daydreams, his muttering
and snatches of crazy song, his bursts of obscenity and afflatus
of glory."M
The holding in the present case was the ultimate conclusion to a group of cases decided during the 1966 term. In all
of those cases it was apparent that the Court had_ developed
a more concrete and consistent attitude about the limitations
to which electronic eavesdropping should be subjected. Yet,
it was also apparent that electronic search and seizure was considered essential to police functions and was therefor accorded
favorable consideration. Although the holdings of the cases
were based upon distinguishable fact situations and were
contrary to the holding in Katz each contained intimations
of the holding which would result when the desirable case
arose. In Hoffa v. United States27 an informer named Partin
related to federal agents his account of the Teamster President's attempt to rig a jury verdict. The informant had
obtained the information by establishing himself as one of
Hoffa's confidants. There was controversy whether the informant was a spy placed among Hoffa's coherts by government agents or a voluntary informer. The Court found resolution of this issue unnecessary, and concluded that the informant's elucidations were correctly admitted by the trial court
as evidence. Although it was agreed that Hoffa's hotel room
26.

CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 151 (1949).

27. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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was a constitutionally protected area, and that the oral statements made therein were also protected, a majority opined
that the "fundamental nature and scope" of the fourth
amendment protects only "the security a man relies upon
when he places himself within a constitutionally protected
area." 2 Because Hoffa had invited the informer into his
hotel suite, and had voluntarily conversed with him, he was
"not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal
his wrong doing."" 9 The reference to a constitutionally protected area in Hoffa is now immaterial in light of Katz, but
the basic premise of that decision, reliance upon privacy, is
consistent with Katz.
Osborn v. United States" arose out of a later Hoffa
trial. One Vick was persuaded by Hoffa's attorney to investigate prospective jurors in an attempt to find an individual
amenable to tampering. Vick had previously agreed to report
to the government any illegal activities which might transpire
in his association with the attorney. Pursuant to a warrant
issued by a district court judge, Vick employed a tiny microphone recorder concealed on his person to obtain several incriminating statements in reference to the attorney's attempts
to rig a jury. The district court authorization was upheld by
the Supreme Court, and the recorded evidence was held admissible as evidence in the attorney's criminal trial. Again in this
case there was an invitee, however devious his purpose, and
a voluntary statement by the defendant, each indicative of an
unjustifiable reliance on privacy, if indeed there was a
reliance at all. This clearly foreshadowed the holding in the
Katz decision that electronic surveillance conducted according
to fourth amendment requirements would be legal, a ramification discussed later.
In Lewis v. United States,"' a federal narcotics agent
deviously persuaded Lewis to engage in a transaction for
the sale and purchase of narcotics, the fruits of the transaction subsequently being introduced as evidence at the
defendant's trial. To the petitioner's contention that the
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
385 U.S. 323 (1966).
385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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scheme violated his fourth amendment rights, the Court responded, "it presents no question of the invasion of the
[right of] ...privacy ...; the only statements repeated were
those that were willingly made to the agent and the only
things taken were the packets of marihuana (sic) voluntarily
transferred to him. The pretense resulted in no breach of
privacy; it merely encouraged the suspect to say things which
he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who would be
The absence of
interested in purchasing marihuana (sic).'
reliance on privacy was the apparent crux of the Court's
decision. It is submitted that Katz is the only one of the four
cases which propounds any general proposition: Where an
unauthorized eavesdrop is conducted in violation of an individual's right or privacy, justifiably relied upon, the fruits
of the surveillance will not be admissible as evidence in a
criminal prosecution. Hoffa, Osborn and Lewis are simply
illustrations of circumstances in which the reliance on privacy
is not justifiable, and hence the evidence obtained by the
surveillance is legally obtainable and admissible.
It is further submitted that the Katz decision does not
prohibit electronic eavesdropping absolutely, nor in fact does
it interpret the fourth amendment as prohibiting any eavesdropping where it is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued
on a sufficient showing of probable cause. Mr. Justice Stewart
remarked of the surveillance:
It is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly
circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate properly notified of the need of such investigation,
specifically informed of the basis on which it was
to proceed, and clearly appraised of the precise
intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very
limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place."
The opinion additionally asserts that any surveillance is permissible when conducted for a narrow and particularized
purpose, pursuant to judicial authorization, so as not to cause
a greater invasion of privacy than is necessary under the
circumstances."4
32. Id. at 212.
33. 88 S. Ct. 507, 513 (1967).
34. Id.
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The Court's concern then, is not so much with "implications of . . . frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted
marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society,' 5
as with the manner and circumstances in which electronic surveillance is conducted. With the exception of wiretapping,
the issue has never been one of imposing an absolute prohibition on such practices because of the fourth amendment.
Rather, the query has been whether eavesdropping, electronic
or by means of informers, is indeed pervaded by the sanctions
of the fourth amendment. Katz clarifies that electronic surveillance is a type of search and seizure, and is a perfectly
legal means of acquiring proof of the commission of a crime
when conducted pursuant to a warrant issued where there
exists probable cause.
The criteria of a legal electronic search and seizure, and
the sufficiency of purported probable cause, were delineated
in the recent case of Berger v. New York. 6 In that case, a
recording implement was employed to conduct a surveillance
of two weeks' duration, pursuant to judicial order rendered
in accordance with a New York statute. 7 In holding the
evidence procured inadmissible, the Court said that the statute
failed to meet standards of particularity prescribed by the
fourth amendment, namely that: The eavesdrop must be
limited both in time and scope; must be judicially authorized
only on a showing of probability that a particular offense has
been or is being committed; and must involve no more than
the necessary degree of invasion."
Katz resolves a controversy which has too long burdened
society. It placates those who regard electronic eavesdropping
as a despicable, unnecessary practice, by subjecting such
practice to sanctions sufficient to protect the right of privacy. Concurrently it avoids the imposition of an unreasonable burden on law enforcement personnel. The decision
strikes a necessary and desirable compromise. For, while
no good public policy would be served by depriving law
enforcement agencies of the benefit of evidence which can
often be procured only by means of electronic surveillance,
35.
36.
37.
38.

Silverman v. United States, supra note 17, at 509.
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a.
Berger v. New York, supra note 36.
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neither would public policy best be served by allowing such
surveillance to be conducted with unrestrained inattention to
individual dignity. The Court has recognized that the electronic eavesdrop is an indispensable tool of effective police
investigation, but has insured that it will not create an arena
for "a dirty game in which 'the dirty business' of criminals
is outwitted by 'the dirty business' of law officers.''"
FORD T. BUSSART

39.

On Lee v. United States, aupra note 16, at 758 (1952).
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